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Equitable sharing of public health surveillance data can help 
prevent or mitigate the effect of infectious diseases. Equi-
table data sharing includes working toward more equitable 
sharing of the public health benefits that data sharing brings 
and requires the engagement of those providing the data, 
those interpreting and using the data generated by others, 
those facilitating the data-sharing process, and those deriv-
ing and contributing to the benefit. An expert consultation 
conducted by Chatham House outlined 7 principles to en-
courage the process of equitable data sharing: 1) building 
trust, 2) articulating the value, 3) planning for data sharing, 
4) achieving quality data, 5) understanding the legal con-
text, 6) creating data-sharing agreements, and 7) monitor-
ing and evaluation. Sharing of public health surveillance 
data is best done taking into account these principles, which 
will help to ensure data are shared optimally and ethically, 
while fulfilling stakeholder expectations and facilitating eq-
uitable distribution of benefits.
Global outbreaks, including those of severe acute re-spiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory 
syndrome, and Ebola virus disease, remind us that a pub-
lic health event in a single location can rapidly become a 
global crisis. Control of infectious diseases can therefore 
be considered a global public good, and public health sur-
veillance is a tool that helps achieve it. Timely sharing of 
public health surveillance data enables better preparedness 
and response, locally and globally.
Public Health Surveillance
Public health surveillance has been defined as “the ongoing, 
systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of health-
related data with the a priori purpose of preventing or con-
trolling disease or injury and identifying unusual events of 
public health importance, followed by the dissemination 
and use of such information for public health action” (1). 
Public health surveillance data are often collected without 
requiring individual patient consent. This practice is ethi-
cally and legally justified as a part of a government’s re-
sponsibility to protect the public’s health (2) and as a basic 
interest of persons in a pluralistic society (3). These justi-
fications are tempered by the state’s responsibility to use 
data for public health purposes only, engage stakeholders, 
and ensure protection of personal information.
Healthcare professionals are traditionally mandated 
to notify public health authorities about cases of specified 
diseases within a certain timeframe. The authorities then 
analyze the data and take appropriate action. Surveillance 
systems therefore tend to be the responsibility of the gov-
ernment. Most countries provide routine surveillance data 
to multilateral agencies (4), which analyze and disseminate 
information on disease trends at the regional or global lev-
el. These agencies also receive data from countries when 
the impact of a public health event crosses national borders, 
a standard of practice codified by the 2005 International 
Health Regulations (IHR 2005) (5), the international legal 
instrument aimed at assisting the global community to pre-
vent and respond to public health threats that have the po-
tential to affect populations worldwide.
Sources of Data
Public health authorities increasingly complement notifi-
cations with laboratory data (6), although in practice, this 
practice is often limited to high-income countries because 
it requires considerable laboratory capacity and advanced 
information technology infrastructure. Syndromic surveil-
lance, in which health-related data such as the number of 
consultations for a specific diagnosis are reported, is used 
in high- and low-income settings. In some low-income set-
tings, nongovernment actors, such as nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), academic institutions, private compa-
nies, or foreign medical teams, sometimes fill surveillance 
gaps (7), in particular during public health emergencies 
in which temporary, early warning surveillance systems 
based on syndromic surveillance are deployed in response 
to an increased outbreak risk (8).
Increasingly, online data not necessarily collected with 
an a priori health objective are used for public health pur-
poses. Online technologies that provide data for disease 
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or event detection are known as digital disease detection 
(DDD) systems. Data sources include search engine and 
social media queries (9,10), crowd-sourced event-based in-
formation queries (11), machine learning (12), natural lan-
guage processing, and geolocalization (13). In 2014, DDD 
identified the resurgence of poliomyelitis and the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa before the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) officially reported them (14), 2 events WHO 
later declared as Public Health Events of International Con-
cern. As DDD data quality and accuracy improve, DDD 
will likely assume a more prominent role, particularly in 
settings where the infrastructure to support public health 
surveillance systems is lacking (10). However, DDD needs 
more systematic integration into the formal, government-
owned surveillance landscape as well as ties to response 
mechanisms to maximize its potential (10,15). The system-
atic use of nongovernment, informal surveillance systems 
is beginning to gain traction with surveillance systems such 
as WHO’s new Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources, 
an event-based system receiving alerts from a range of in-
formal sources, planned for launch in the near future (16). 
DDD data raise new ethical and legal challenges that need 
to be addressed as they become integrated into conventional 
surveillance systems (17). These data also create competi-
tion for resources or the generation of data that are not con-
sistent with data from conventional surveillance systems; 
these factors can give rise to trust and acceptability issues. 
Nevertheless, evidence for the added value of these data is 
building, and they are increasingly being incorporated into 
conventional surveillance systems.
Why Share Public Health Surveillance Data?
Public health surveillance data require timely sharing to 
ensure more coordinated and effective risk management 
for public health response (18). Sharing public health sur-
veillance data between countries improves capacity for dis-
ease detection and response (19) and can help identify an 
outbreak source when national-level data cannot (20). This 
sharing can also reduce the potential or actual impact of a 
global health crisis. For example, the Global Influenza Sur-
veillance and Response System, a laboratory network that 
shares information to detect the emergence of novel influ-
enza viruses with pandemic potential (21), helped prevent 
SARS from becoming endemic after the 2003 outbreak 
(22). This network also improved the timeliness of the 
response to the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic (21). 
Besides being useful for outbreak management, sharing of 
routine public health surveillance data enables national and 
international collaboration, capacity strengthening, insight 
into public health system performance, and ultimately bet-
ter control of infectious diseases (18).
Real or perceived risks, in particular those risks linked 
to travel and trade restrictions, can lead to a reluctance 
by governments to share data, leading to adverse public 
health and economic consequences. The 2003 SARS out-
break cost an estimated US $40–$80 billion to the global 
economy, with travel and tourism industries badly affected 
(23). China’s delay in sharing information about the 2003 
SARS outbreak contributed to the disease’s spread and 
the delayed global response (24) as well as economic and 
reputation damage to China (25). With Middle East respi-
ratory syndrome, the incomplete assessment of the disease 
origin and source has largely been attributed to a reluctance 
to share public health surveillance data in a timely fash-
ion (26). Sharing of data helps achieve appropriate public 
health action while limiting risks to travel and trade. IHR 
2005 is designed to ensure maximum public health benefit 
while keeping restrictions to a minimum (5). Nevertheless, 
public health surveillance data are not always freely shared 
because of perceived or real technical, political, economic, 
motivational, ethical, and legal barriers (27). Sharing pub-
lic health surveillance data must become the norm.
Which Stakeholders Are Concerned?
Government actors implement most conventional public 
health surveillance systems and generate most data and can 
be complemented by nongovernment actors. In addition 
to having value at the national level, a country’s routine 
public health surveillance data enable multilateral orga-
nizations to generate intelligence on specific diseases at 
the regional and global level. These organizations provide 
standards and advice on data sharing to facilitate the pro-
cess by individual countries and conduct their own surveil-
lance activities (28); examples include the WHO’s global 
measles surveillance system (4) and the European Union’s 
surveillance system (TESSy), which has standardized sur-
veillance across the European Union (29). Such suprana-
tional systems come with their own challenges, such as the 
additional burden placed on individual countries to report 
data already analyzed nationally and the difficulties associ-
ated with comparing different types of data resulting from 
surveillance systems with different national legal bases. In-
stitutions that do not generate data themselves but seek to 
reuse data for academic or public health purposes are also 
part of this data-sharing landscape (Figure).
Stakeholders can be divided into 3 groups that need 
to be engaged for optimal data sharing: 1) data providers, 
who generate public health surveillance data either from 
the community, the healthcare system, or nonhealth sourc-
es; 2) data recipients, who interpret and use data generated 
by others; and 3) data sharing facilitators, those who make 
sharing between data providers and recipients possible.
Individual stakeholders can commonly belong to >1 
group at a time and can assume a different role in different 
situations. For example, a country might provide surveil-
lance data to a multilateral agency and receive data from a 
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neighboring country simultaneously; alternatively, a mul-
tilateral agency might provide data sharing guidelines to 
countries, acting as facilitator, while also receiving and 
analyzing event-based data.
Disease outbreaks caused by Ebola virus (2014–2016) 
and Zika virus (2016), among others, have increased aware-
ness of the importance of data sharing among global health 
stakeholders. In addition to several other recent calls to share 
research data during emergencies (30,31), in 2016, a group of 
≈40 international public health leaders published a statement 
calling on stakeholders to share “all public health surveil-
lance data, as necessary to improve and protect public health” 
(18; online Technical Appendix, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/24/7/15-1830-Techapp1.pdf). This statement 
further outlined that public health surveillance data sharing 
should be the norm, rather than the exception, with public 
health surveillance data made accessible in a timely manner 
while taking appropriate steps to safeguard the privacy of 
individuals and other legitimate public interests. Accord-
ingly, the statement asked stakeholders to commit to 1) 
sharing public health surveillance data by default when a 
public health need is identified; 2) using public health sur-
veillance data responsibly, with the intention of protecting 
and improving the health of the population; 3) making the 
benefits explicit; 4) ensuring that public health surveillance 
data are shared with as few restrictions as possible and in 
an ethical way.
Principles for Sharing Public Health  
Surveillance Data
Formulating principles to promote and facilitate data shar-
ing in public health is not a new concept. An example is the 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (32). This 
guidance document is restricted to 1 disease and resulted 
only after extensive negotiations (32). In addition to such 
international efforts, individual funders often have specific 
data-sharing policies (33).
The principles we outline here are the result of a con-
sultation process with ≈100 experts, including those from 
the fields of public health, law, ethics, politics, and data 
sharing, including experts from WHO, the World Organ-
isation for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations. The consulta-
tion was convened by the Chatham House Centre on Global 
Health Security (34). The principles form the basis of a 
guide to sharing public health surveillance data and ben-
efits. This guide, available in hard copy and as an online 
interactive tool (https://datasharing.chathamhouse.org), 
addresses perceived and real barriers and is intended to fa-
cilitate equitable sharing of public health surveillance data 
and benefits. Equitable in this context is taken to mean that 
data and benefits are shared among stakeholders according 
to individual, organizational, and public health needs. The 
guide enables sharing without the need for prolonged ne-
gotiation by creating an environment conducive to sharing 
data and achieving good practice.
The Principles
This approach is governed by 7 principles. Each incorpo-
rates the ethical concepts most relevant to data sharing: so-
cial beneficence, respect, justice, and transparency. Those 
principles also strive to ensure that sharing data when a 
need is identified leads to equitable sharing of public health 
benefits and capacity-building where necessary and appro-
priate. This component is particularly important when the 
parties sharing the data have different capacities to benefit 
because of unequal resources. The principles encourage 
parties who are better resourced to ensure that others ben-
efit from the process according to need.
1. Building Trust
Trust facilitates successful data sharing, which in turn fur-
ther reinforces trust. Two principal dimensions to trust are 
brought to bear when public health surveillance data are 
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shared. First, organizations sharing public health surveil-
lance data should do so in a transparent manner and should 
be able to demonstrate to communities from which the data 
originate how their data are collected, analyzed, used, and 
protected. Second, trust-building measures between organi-
zations or individuals sharing data, whether at the personal 
or organizational level, help create an environment where 
public health surveillance data can be shared. Transparency 
with regard to what data are shared with whom, and for 
what purpose, is a prerequisite. Trust includes ensuring that 
the shared data are used responsibly and not made avail-
able to other parties or publicly without consulting the data 
providers. When the purpose of sharing data is clear and 
explicit, and those persons involved in sharing know each 
other, understand each other’s expectations, and carry out 
commitments as agreed, a trust relationship can emerge. 
Established trust increases the likelihood of collaboration 
and shared benefits and promotes core surveillance ca-
pacity through the creation of surveillance networks (19). 
Building trust for routine data sharing can provide strong 
foundations for emergency surveillance and response. 
Building trust can be hard, but losing trust is all too easy.
In practice, trust often translates into developing ap-
propriate professional relationships with counterparts in 
other countries or regions (35). Trust-building measures 
sometimes take the form of face-to-face meetings, regional 
workshops, desktop exercises, or joint outbreak investiga-
tions (19). For data recipients, providers must be trustwor-
thy in providing high-quality data. Therefore, improving 
data quality through capacity-building (for example, by 
sharing technical expertise) is in their interest.
2. Articulating the Value
The benefits of sharing should be explicitly articulated 
when public health surveillance data are shared. However, 
loss of rights over the data and the potential for misuse can 
increase the risk of data providers being reluctant to share 
because of real or perceived reputational damage and loss 
of benefits, either in terms of public health or, for example, 
publication opportunities (35). Because of these potential 
negative outcomes, some public health authorities have 
used legal or operating standards to restrict data sharing 
(36). When initiating data sharing, the purpose must be ex-
plicit, and all stakeholders should be able to understand the 
value of sharing the data, who will have access to the data, 
and how the data will be used. Stakeholders must also be 
assured that they will benefit from the sharing process in 
an equitable manner in terms of collaboration opportuni-
ties and public health benefits. In situations where no di-
rect benefits to the data providers exist, the sharing process 
should ensure that, at a minimum, those providing data do 
not suffer adverse public health consequences or lose op-
portunities for publication, collaboration, or otherwise.
Such assurances maximize the utility of the data while 
allowing data providers to retain control over the data, 
thereby encouraging data sharing. Any data use viewed as 
data harvesting (i.e., when data recipients use data while no 
benefit is enjoyed by the data provider) is unjust and unfair. 
Such a practice increases reluctance to share and jeopar-
dizes sharing globally. Conversely, organizations claiming 
ownership of, and restricting access to, public health sur-
veillance data when such actions would decrease potential 
health benefits derived from those data is unacceptable.
3. Planning for Data Sharing
Public health surveillance data should be collected with 
potential sharing in mind. Sharing is most successful when 
expectations of all stakeholders are met and it addresses 
a need, whether real or perceived (35), which should be 
identified in advance to help ensure timeliness of sharing.
An a posteriori approach to sharing might not maxi-
mize benefits, particularly when timeliness is a key element 
of success, such as in emergencies. Planning for data shar-
ing extends to all steps of the data-management lifecycle 
(i.e., data collection, processing, analysis, preservation, ac-
cess, reuse, and disposal) (37). This effort requires techni-
cal capacity, information technology infrastructure, and a 
workforce with data-management skills.
Planning also requires a professional ethic for respon-
sibility to protect identifiable data, which are often col-
lected without individual consent. Preserving confidential-
ity of individual-level data is critical because societies can 
sometimes respond to persons with infectious diseases in 
stigmatizing and discriminatory ways.
Data-sharing and data-management standards, in par-
ticular with regard to metadata, help maximize quality, util-
ity, and reuse potential. Data recipients benefit from high 
standards, which ensure that they will be able to reuse data 
according to their agreed purpose. The time and skills re-
quired to collect and manage data in adherence with rel-
evant standards should be taken into account when hiring 
and training staff. Having a data provider with the human 
resource and technical capacity to provide the data to re-
quired standards is in the data recipient’s interest. As such, 
data sharing can be an opportunity for IHR 2005–mandated 
capacity-building.
4. Achieving Quality Data
High-quality data enable the generation of high-quality evi-
dence and therefore lead to better public health outcomes. 
Surveillance data can be evaluated for relevance, accuracy, 
timeliness, accessibility, interpretability, and coherence, 
among other characteristics (38). Generally, trade-offs exist 
between these characteristics, and the attributes to prioritize 
should be considered when sharing the data. Overall, data 
accessibility and sharing subject the data to feedback and 
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therefore improves quality. Technical and human resource 
implications of data quality exist; for example, standardiza-
tion and automation can make sharing less expensive, more 
effective, and easier (35). Standardization also improves 
the validity and public health benefit of comparative analy-
ses, which are particularly challenging to interpret if data 
from nonstandardized surveillance systems are aggregated. 
High-quality data production requires a skilled workforce 
to develop, manage, and evaluate surveillance systems 
(35). However, when a public health situation warrants the 
rapid sharing of data, concerns about quality should not be 
a reason not to share, providing sufficient confidence in the 
data to inform public health action exists. Quality should be 
balanced with timeliness.
5. Understanding the Legal Context
The legal implications of data sharing and the most suit-
able type of agreement depend on geographic location, 
type of institution involved, type of data, level of public 
health threat, and other contextual factors. Parties should 
understand the legal implications and tools available. Shar-
ing public health surveillance data across borders has legal 
implications when the type of data shared is protected by 
national or international law. This concern applies mainly 
to disaggregated data containing confidential or personal 
information. In current practice, guidance on the legal 
implications of cross-border public health data sharing is 
not readily available. Where this guidance does exist, the 
balance between making data accessible, safeguarding 
privacy, and protecting intellectual property is not well 
regulated or standardized, which can result in protective 
policies (27). Governments are often more likely to focus 
on safeguarding their institutions against liability when 
creating agreements, whereas nongovernment institutions 
sometimes focus more on intellectual property concerns.
Data-sharing agreements can help resolve differences 
or ambiguities in law and are most successful when the 
context is defined as precisely as possible, supported by 
local knowledge, and when relevant laws and regulations 
are taken into account. In some instances, an agreement 
that is not legally binding may be more suitable than using 
legal means.
6. Creating Data-Sharing Agreements
Formal data-sharing agreements are unnecessary if infor-
mal arrangements are sufficient to accomplish the goal of 
sharing. The rights and interests of stakeholders should 
be properly taken into account whatever arrangements 
are made. When more formal agreements are required, 
they can take different shapes, from short memoranda of 
understanding to detailed, legally binding data-sharing 
agreements. Depending on the context, the agreement can 
take place at the local, national, regional, or global level. 
Whatever form they take, successful and sustainable data-
sharing agreements require consideration of the needs and 
expectations of all parties. Agreements drafted before the 
needs and expectations of all parties are understood can 
lead to inequities in the sharing of benefits (35). This im-
balance can also result in missed opportunities for knowl-
edge and skills capacity-building. Parties should collabo-
rate and ensure that the terms of reference are acceptable to 
all, data providers have the opportunity to take part in any 
data analysis if they wish so, benefits are shared equitably, 
and potential harms to individuals and communities are 
minimized. Tools and resources to help parties initiate or 
revise data sharing agreements are available online (https://
datasharing.chathamhouse.org)
7. Monitoring and Evaluation
Sharing data only leads to public health benefit if a need is 
addressed and the data are visible and usable. Therefore, 
it is important to ensure that the data are shared accord-
ing to the plan, used for the intended purposes once they 
have been shared, and achieve the desired effect. If these 
outcomes are not achieved, the reasons should be ana-
lyzed. As new sources of surveillance data emerge and as 
data are successfully shared, recording and disseminating 
success stories that demonstrate the added value of data 
sharing also are important. These stories can help trigger 
a “norm cascade” that creates a critical mass of stakehold-
ers who adopt data sharing as a normative expectation 
(39). In addition, in situations where sharing did not have 
the expected result or a lack of data sharing contributed 
to negative public health outcomes, the process should be 
documented and analyzed to help understand and make 
improvements in the future.
Conclusions
Sharing surveillance data improves public health. We pro-
pose an approach to data sharing that creates an environ-
ment conducive to sharing, encourages good practice, and 
ensures that the benefits derived from the sharing process 
are equitably distributed.
The public health surveillance landscape is complex, 
with a range of government and nongovernment stakehold-
ers who can provide and receive data as well as facilitate 
sharing. Optimal sharing requires an understanding of the 
roles and responsibilities of these stakeholders. The 7 prin-
ciples for public health surveillance data sharing we pro-
pose address good practice for the sharing of public health 
surveillance data. Those principles serve as the basis for 
comprehensive guidance with actionable recommendations 
for all stakeholders. The complete guidance is available on-
line (https://datasharing.chathamhouse.org).
Sharing of public health surveillance data is best done 
with an agreement that takes into account those principles, 
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which will help to ensure that data are shared optimally and 
ethically, while fulfilling the expectations of stakeholders 
and facilitating equitable distribution of benefits. We en-
courage stakeholders, and in particular multilateral orga-
nizations, to consider these principles when strengthening 
frameworks and capacity for data sharing.
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